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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Verna Lombard appeals from the sentence and restitution order imposed 
upon her conviction for burglary and grand theft. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
Responding to a customer's tip, Don Ebert, co-owner of Mary Ann's 
Groceries in Weippe, set up hidden video cameras in his store to observe the 
activities of clerk Verna Lombard. (Tr., p.32, L.18 - p.36, L.22.) Ebert also 
reviewed the cash register till tapes generated during Lombard's shifts. (& 
generally, Tr., p.40, L.14 - p.163, L.1.) 
Ebert discovered that on approximately fifty-three occasions during the six 
days Lombard was under video surveillance, Lombard entered the "no sale" key 
into the cash register, yet took money from the customer in exchange for 
merchandise or gas. (Id.) Thus, explained Ebert, Lombard executed cash sales 
that would not be recorded as sales on the cash register till tapes. (Id.) Then, 
Ebert observed, Lombard would periodically take money from the cash register 
and put it in her back pocket. (Id.) At the end of each day, the sales receipts 
would thus correspond with the money in the till. (Id.) 
Ebert also located a number of credit card receipts, indicating completed 
sales processed by Lombard, that corresponded by date and time with "no sale" 
events entered into the cash register till during Lombard's shifts. (Tr., p.162, L.3 
- p.166, L.22.) The earliest such receipt, for $49.95, was from October 19, 2004. 
(Tr.,p.166, L.23-~.167,L.7.) 
Finally, while recognizing there are some legitimate reasons to enter the 
"no sale" key into the cash register, Ebert, in reviewing the cash register till tapes, 
noticed that the number of "no sale" events entered during Lombard's shifts was 
significantly higher than the amount of "no sale" events entered during other 
employees' shifts during the entirety of Lombard's employment at Mary Ann's 
Groceries. (Tr.,p.167,L.8-p.170,L.lO.) 
On September 9, 2007, after completing her sixth shift following the 
installation of the video cameras, Lombard was arrested by Officer Mitchell Jared 
for burglary and grand theft. (Tr., p.220, L.11 - p.221, L.18.) At the time of her 
arrest, Lombard had $282 in her back pocket. (Tr., p.223, L.22 - p.227, L.12.) 
The bills were separated into ten groups that were folded together. (Id.) After 
Officer Jared intentionally misled Lombard into believing that she had actually 
been under video surveillance since June, Lombard admitted to stealing money 
from Mary Ann's Groceries since late June. (Tr., p.230, L.21 - p.232, L.13.) 
Lombard told Officer Jared that while she did not steal from the store every day, 
she stole approximately $50 to $60 dollars per day that she did steal. (Tr., p.232, 
Ls.13-18.) 
A jury found Lombard guilty of burglary and grand theft. (R. p.121.) The 
district court sentenced her to concurrent unified sentences of eight years, with 
two and a half years fixed. (R., pp.?21-122.) The court retained jurisdiction. 
(Id.) The length of the indeterminate portion of the sentence was designed, at 
least in part, to allow Lombard ample time to comply with any restitution order. 
(Tr., p.273, Ls.23-25.) The court also scheduled a restitution hearing. (R., 
p.122.) 
The state submitted an affidavit for restitution requesting that Lombard be 
ordered to pay $100,000 to Mary Ann's Groceries, and $5,000 to Western 
Community lnsurance Company, which had paid out on a policy owned by the 
victims. (R., pp.108-109, 114-115.) Don Ebert, who has a background in 
statistics, submitted several estimates calculating the total extent of Lombard's 
theft. (R., pp.112-113; Tr., p.287, L.5 - p.291, L.18.) The estimates ranged from 
$71,936.81 to $204,446.86, and were based on information in the record 
concerning when Lombard began working at Mary Ann's Groceries, the earliest 
documented theft, the amount of money found on her person at the time of 
arrest, and the average amount of "no-sale" entries recorded by the cash register 
till during Lombard's shifts compared to the that recorded during the shifts of 
other employees. (R., pp.112-113; Tr., p.245, L.25 - p.247, L.9; Tr., p.288, L.19 
- p.291, L.10.) 
Utilizing the average of the lowest range of estimates provided by Ebert, 
the district court ordered Lombard to pay $80,000 in restitution to Mary Ann's 
Groceries, and $5,000 to Western Community Insurance Company. (R., pp.136- 
137; Tr., p.305, Ls.3-12.) Lombard timely appealed her sentence and the 
restitution order. (R., pp. 139-142.) 
ISSUES 
Lombard states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether or not the District Court abused its discretion in 
ordering a restitution amount that was not supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence and is thus not supported by 
substantial evidence. 
2. Whether or not the District Court abused its discretion in 
sentencing Verna Lombard by considering facts not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Lombard failed to show that the district court's order of restitution was 
not supported by substantial evidence? 
2. Has Lombard failed to show that the district court abused its discretion at 
sentencing? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court's Restitution Award Was Supported By Substantial Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Lombard claims that the district court abused its discretion by ordering her 
to pay $85,000 in restitution. However, because the restitution order was 
supported by substantial evidence, Lombard has failed to show that the district 
court abused its discretion.' 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is 
committed to the trial court's discretion, and the trial court's factual findings in 
relation to restitution will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. 
State v. Smith, 144 ldaho 687, 692, 169 P.3d 275, 280 (Ct. App. 2007). 
C. The District Court's Restitution Award For Lombard's Theft Was 
Supported By Substantial Evidence 
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304(2), the district court is authorized to order 
restitution for any economic loss which the victim actually suffers. Unless the 
court determines that an order of restitution would be inappropriate or 
undesirable, it is required to order a defendant to make restitution. I.C. 5 19- 
5304(2). Value need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, 
' Lombard also appears to argue that the court abused its discretion by rejecting 
the parties' Rule 11 plea agreement. (See Appellant's brief, pp.1, 5-6, 13-15.) 
This Court should not entertain this claim, however, because it is not supported 
by argument or authority (State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 
(1996)), and it is not included in Lombard's issue statement (I.A.R. 35(a)(4)). 
see I.C. (i 19-5304(6), and can be established by the owner of the property. 
-
Empire Lumber Co. v. Thermal-Dynamic Towers, Inc., 132 Idaho 295, 306, 971 
P.2d 1119, 1130 (1998). 
The state filed an affidavit requesting $100,000 in restitution. (R., pp.108- 
109.) The victim, Don Ebert, provided the court with two estimate ranges of 
Lombard's total theft based on the evidence in the case. (R., pp.112-113; Tr., 
p.245, L.25 - p.247, L.9; Tr., p.288, L.19 - p.291, 1.10.) Ebert also described his 
qualifications to make such calculations. (Tr., p.287, L.17 - p.288, L.15.) 
On appeal, Lombard contends that by relying on Ebert's calculated 
estimates of her theft, the district court abused its discretion. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.4-13.) Lombard argues that "[rlestitution is limited to actual loss and thus 
should not be speculative at all. The statistical analysis offered by Don Ebert and 
subsequently adopted by the District Court is nothing but speculations," and that 
, , : 
"[tlhe State failed to make any showing of actual loss." (Appellant's brief, p.10.) 
Lombard also attempts to place some of the blame for the restitution dispute with 
the record-keeping of Mary Ann's Groceries, arguing that, "[it's] a matter of 
simple bookkeeping and accounting to determine how much 'cash' should have 
been running through the business based on the sale of inventory. [It's] then 
simply a matter of identifying the actual cash versus the amount of cash that 
should have been running through the store." (Appellant's brief, p.9.) 
The record shows, however, that the district court's restitution award was 
supported by substantial evidence, and was based on the actual loss of the 
victims. Because the district court restitution award was clearly directed towards 
Ebert's actual, not speculative loss, Lombard's argument that the state did not 
present the type of evidence she would have preferred fails to show the order 
was not based on substantial evidence. 
In State v. Benoit, 310 Mont. 449, 457, 51 P.3d 495, 500-501 (2002), The 
Montana Supreme Court recognized the inherent challenges involving the 
estimation of the scope of stealth employee theft over a period of time, for the 
purpose of determining appropriate restitution: 
The evidence presented at the [restitution] hearing in this 
case establishes that actual losses resulting from [the defendant's] 
theft could not be determined with certainty. As a result, [the victim] 
made several assumptions to determine restitution. [The 
defendant's] witness, Loucks, disputed the assumptions made by 
[the victim] and suggested several variables which could be further 
explored to compile restitution, but he acknowledged that there is 
often "some guess work associated with determining losses 
sustained from employee theft. Loucks further acknowledged that 
implementation of such variables could alter the amount of 
restitution calculated by [the victim] to [the defendant's] detriment. 
Moreover, [the defendant] did not provide the court with a 
reasonable estimation of the losses sustained by [the victim]. 
Therefore, we conclude that the methods utilized by [the victim] and 
subsequently adopted by the court were reasonable based on the 
best evidence available under the circumstances presented in this 
case. 
Similarly, the district court in the present case also recognized these 
challenges, and adopted reasonable estimations based on the best evidence 
available under the circumstances presented: 
I'm going to make findings that given the nature of the 
offense, if we took [the defendant's] approach that you can never 
use a statistical model there would never be restitution in this sort 
of offense, and what that would mean is that the criminal conduct 
trumps the victim's right for restitution. And I don't think that's what 
the law requires. I think it requires the reverse of that. And while 
there does have to be shown by a preponderance of the evidence 
[sic], I think given the nature of the offense, a statistical model is 
appropriate. And it can only be based on the information they 
have, and I think Mr. Ebert has done that. He's shown himself to 
[be] accomplished in statistical analysis. 
(Tr., p.304, L.14-p.305, L.2.) 
The district court's reasoning was proper, particularly considering the 
public policy underlying the ldaho restitution statute to "favor full compensation to 
crime victims who suffer economic loss." State v. Bvbee, 115 ldaho 541, 543, 
768 P.2d 804, 806 (Ct. App. 1989). Pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304(2), unless the 
district court determined that an order of restitution would be inappropriate or 
undesirable, which it clearly did not, it was required to order Lombard to make 
restitution to her victims for economic loss resulting from the crime. 
While the court's restitution order relied on estimates supplied by the 
victim, these estimates, and the restitution order amount of $85,000, was 
supported by substantial evidence in the record: 
Victims Don and Cammie Ebert submitted a letter to the court 
stating that they believed that Verna Lombard stole at least 
$100,000 from Mary Ann's Groceries. (R., p.1 I I .) 
The state submitted a letter and receipts from Western Community 
Insurance indicating that it had paid the victims $5,000 in fulfillment 
of an insurance policy protecting against employee theft. (R,, 
pp.114-115.) 
Lombard admitted stealing between $50 and $60 "most days" 
between late June and her September arrest. (Tr., p.231, L.24 - 
p.233, L.25.) 
Over a six-month sampling of cash register till tape data, Lombard's 
shifts averaged 10.13 more "no sale" events than the average 
number of "no sale" events recorded during shifts that she did not 
work. This difference increased throughout Lombard's 
employment, from 7.46 per day in July 2004, to 12.28 per day in 
June 2007. This difference also "spiked" during a two week period 
when the Eberts were away on vacation, and had left the store 
under limited supervision. (R., pp.112-113; Tr., p.168, L.13 - 
p.170, L.IO;Tr.,p.288, L.19-p.289, L.7.) 
Upon her arrest, Lombard had $282 in her back pocket. The bills 
were folded into ten groups. This approximately corresponds with 
the twelve suspicious "no sale" transactions observed on that day. 
(Tr., p.223, L.22-p.227, L.12.) 
During the six days Lombard was under video surveillance, she 
executed approximately fifty-three inappropriate "no sale" events, 
and was observed periodically removing cash from the cash 
register and placing it in her pocket. (Tr., p.40, L.14 - p.152, L.5; 
p.282, Ls.18-22.) 
Store customer LanceNewton, who tipped off the Eberts to the 
thefts, testified that he observed Lombard complete suspicious 
transactions "20 or 3 0  times between June and August 2007. 
Newton noticed that during these transactions, unlike transactions 
he observed involving other clerks, the cash register tape didn't 
move upon the completion of the sale. (Tr., p.15, L.23 - p.21, L.6.) 
Ebert submitted one estimate that calculated a 95% probability that 
Lombard stole between $71,936.81 and $97,626.76. This estimate 
was based on the assumptions that: (1) the first day Lombard stole 
from the business was in October 2004 (the date of her earliest 
documented theft), (2) Lombard averaged 10.13 inappropriate "no 
sale" events (i.e. thefts) per shift, and (3) she stole an average of 
$16 per inappropriate "no sale" events (based approximately on the 
amount of money found on her person at the time of arrest, $282, 
less $100 that Lombard told police she had brought from home that 
day, divided by 10.13, the average estimated number of 
inappropriate "no sale" events per day). (R., pp.112-113; Tr., 
p.288, L.39 - p.291, L.18.) 
Ebert submitted a second estimate that calculated a 95% 
probability that Lombard stole between $150,647.79 and 
$204,446.86. This estimate was based on the assumptions that: 
(1) Lombard stole every day during her employment, which started 
in September 2002, (2) Lombard averaged 10.13 inappropriate "no 
sale" events (i.e. thefts) per shift, and (3) she stole an average of 
$26 per inappropriate "no sale" event (based approximately on the 
amount of money found on her person at the time of arrest, $282, 
divided by 10.13, the average estimated number of inappropriate 
"no sale" events per day). (R., pp.112-113; Tr., p.288, L.19 - 
p.291, L.18.) 
* Ebert testified that Mary Ann's Groceries generated approximately 
$150,000 more in gross revenue the year after Lombard was 
arrested and her employment was terminated. (Tr., p.295, L.21 - 
p.296, L.23.) 
• Ebert testified that during Lombard's employment at Mary Ann's 
Groceries, "everybody" in the community knew that the Lombards 
had purchased boats, four-wheelers, campers and Jeeps, and that 
they built a new house. (Tr., p.249, Ls.8-25.) 
Lombard has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
ordering her to pay $85,000 based on this evidence. While, as emphasized by 
Lombard, Ebert's calculations required some statistical assumptions, these 
assumptions were based on evidence in the record. Neither these assumptions, 
nor the data they were based on, were contested by Lombard, who also did not 
contest Ebert's methodology, present any evidence at the restitution hearing, or 
propose an alternative restitution amount. Lombard, rather, simply objected to 
any utilization of Ebert's estimates as "speculation." 
In ordering restitution consistent with the lesser of Ebert's two estimates, 
the district court noted that it "was going to take the more conservative approach, 
simply because it seems to be awfully hard for any reasonable person to 
question that amount." (Tr., p.305, Ls.3-6.) The district court's restitution order 
was supported by substantial, and uncontested, evidence. 
Finally, Lombard's implication that by not keeping exhaustive records of 
inventory, the victims bear responsibility for the court's inability to exactly identify 
appropriate restitution is without merit. Mary Ann's Grocery is a small, family- 
owned store. (Tr., p.24, L.15 - p.25, L.6.) Don Ebert testified that an inventory 
control system is uncommon in a business that size. (Tr., p.294, L.15 - p.295, 
L.4.) It was this very lack of a sophisticated inventory system that Lombard took 
advantage of in carrying out these thefts. While recognizing the state's burden of 
proof, Lombard should not be permitted to continue to take advantage of the 
nature of Mary Ann's Grocery as a small, family-owned store, and to thus avoid 
paying appropriate restitution. 
Lombard has not provided argument or authority, using the proper 
standard, as to why a district court cannot rely on estimates such as that utilized 
in this case to determine appropriate restitution. The district court was within its 
discretion to order restitution amounts well within the estimated ranges supported 
by the evidence 
11. 
Lombard Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused its Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Lombard contends that since the district court abused its discretion in 
awarding Ebert restitution, it also abused its discretion in sentencing Lombard to 
a unified prison term of eight years. However, because the restitution order was 
proper, Lombard's claim is without merit. Further, even if the restitution order is 
vacated or modified, Lombard has still failed to show that the district court 
abused its discretion at sentencing. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The sentence imposed by a trial court is reviewed for a clear abuse of 
discretion. State v. Baker, 136 ldaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Zaitseva, 135 ldaho 11, 13 P.3d 338 (2000)). 
C. The District Court Properlv Exercised Its Discretion At Sentencinq 
Lombard contends that the district court abused its discretion by imposing 
a unified eight-year sentence, for the purpose of allowing Lombard ample time to 
comply with any restitution order, when, as she alleges, the entry of the 
restitution order was itself an abuse of the district court's discretion. (Appellant's 
brief, p.13.) However, as discussed above, the district court's restitution order 
was appropriate. Further, even if this Court vacates or modifies the restitution 
order. Lombard has not shown that the district court abused its discretion at 
sentencing. 
ldaho appellate courts presume that the sentencing court is able to 
ascertain the relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and 
material which is presented to it during the sentencing process. State v. Pierce, 
100 ldaho 57, 58, 593 P.2d 392, 393 (1979); State v. Bundy, 122 ldaho 11 1, 113, 
831 P.2d 953, 955 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Holmes, 104 ldaho 312, 314, 658 
P.2d 983, 985 (Ct. App. 1983). "A sentencing judge may properly conduct an 
inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited, either as to kind of information 
considered or the source from which it may come." State v. Wickel, 126 ldaho 
578, 580, 887 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Chapman, 120 
ldaho 466, 816 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1991)). A sentence is reasonable if it 
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any 
of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. State 
v. Baker, 136 ldaho 576, 577,38 P.3d 614,615 (2001). 
The district court sentenced Lombard prior to the restitution hearing and 
entry of any restitution order. (R., pp.105-106.) However, the evidence 
presented at trial and during the sentencing hearing made clear that the amount 
stolen by Lombard was substantial. The district court did not find Lombard's 
assertion that she stole only a total of $400 credible.' (Tr., p.269, L.13 - p.270, 
L.15.) While the exact amount of the restitution order would not be determined 
until the later restitution hearing, it was appropriate for the court to consider the 
impact of restitution on this case in fashioning a sentence. 
Further, the district court's sentencing analysis confirmed that the 
sentence was based on factors other than restitution. The court thoroughly 
discussed the proper sentencing factors both at the start of the sentencing 
hearing, and during its verbal sentencing analysis. (Tr., p.238, L.16 - p.239, 
L.21; p.269, L . l  - p.274, L.9.) In particular, the court expressed concern about 
Lombard's inability to take responsibility for the full extent of her crimes, and the 
impact of this inability on Lombard's potential rehabilitation. (Id.) 
Finally, the court's sentence, which included the privilege of the rider 
program, was objectively reasonable regardless of the final restitution award. 
Lombard apparently made the claim that she only stole $400 during her 
employment at Mary Ann's Groceries to the pre-sentence investigator (Tr., p.260, 
Ls.19-21). However, the PSI has not been included in the appellate record. The 
appellant has the burden of providing an adequate record to substantiate his or 
her claims of error before the appellate court. State v. Beason, 119 ldaho 103, 
105, 803 P.2d 1009, 101 1 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Murinko, 108 ldaho 872, 873, 
702 P.2d 910, 911 (Ct. App. $985). "In the absence of an adequate record on 
appeal, we will not presume error." State v. Lonaoria, 133 ldaho 819, 823, 992 
P.2d 1219, 1223 (Ct. App. 1999). "Missing portions of the record must be 
presumed to support the action of the trial court." Lonsoria, 133 ldaho at 823, 
992 P.2d at 1223 (citing Kunler v. Drown, 119 ldaho 687, 690, 809 P.2d 1166, 
1169 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
Lombard betrayed the trust of her employers and friends repeatedly over a 
period of time. (Tr., p.245, Ls.18-24.) She has failed to show that the district 
abused its discretion 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
restitution order, and Lombard's sentence. 
DATED this 28th day of January 2010 
TJ - C-C 
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